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RECENT DECISIONS
EviDENc--Waiver-Dead Man's Act-Answering of interrogatories
filed by decedent's representative constitutes a waiver of protection
afforded by Dead Man's Act even if not used at trial.
Perlis v. Kuhns, Adm'r., 202 Pa. Super. 80, 195 A.2d 156 (1963).
Appellee, plaintiff, filed suit for the recovery of damages for personal
injuries arising out of an automobile collision with appellant's dece-
dent. Following institution of the suit, appellant filed written inter-
rogatories, in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, to be answered under oath by the appellee. The Board of
Arbitrators1 found for the appellee and on appeal to the Court of
Common Pleas, the jury similarly found for the appellee. At the trial
the court permitted the appellee to testify to occurrences which took
place before the death of appellant's decedent over the objection of
appellant based on the so-called Dead Man's Act.2 The lower court
held that
... appellee was competent to testify because the filing of the
interrogatories by the appellant which had been answered
by the appellee precluded the operation of the "Dead Man's
Act".3
An appeal was taken to the superior court which affirmed the judg-
ment of the lower court.
In its decision the superior court relied principally on the proposi-
tion that the taking of a deposition of an opponent constituted a
waiver of the objection of incompetency and that interrogatories are
the equivalent of depositions under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure. 4 The court in its rationale chose to follow the minority
view which prevails in the States of Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky,
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 30 (1959) provides for arbitration in all cases
where the amount in controversy shall be $2000 or less.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28 § 322 (1887); For a general discussion of the Act
see, Henry, Competency of Survivor or Person With Adverse Interest to Testily
in Event of Death or Lunacy of the Other Party, 5 U. Prrr. L. REv. 125 (1938-39).
3. Perlis v. Kuhns, Adm'r., 202 Pa. Super. 80, 81, 195 A.2d 156, 157 (1963).
4. Pa. R. Civ. P. 4004, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 Appendix (1951).
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and West Virginia, 5 and declined to follow the majority of courts
which hold that the incompetency of a witness is not removed unless
the protected party introduces such testimony into evidence. 6
The court quoted with approval the statement made in Cox v.
Gettys7 that
Any other construction of the statute would enable one
party to search the conscience of his adversary, drag to light
his -private papers and other evidence, and then repudiate the
result, if the experiment proved unsatisfactory. 8
The court indicated that the taking of depositions or the filing of
interrogatories requires the adverse party to give testimony under
oath sanctioned by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and
this is the equivalent of placing the party on the witness stand at the
trial.
The difficulty with the court's decision lies in the fact that it failed
to differentiate between what the attorney for the decedent should be
permitted to know and what should be admitted into evidence for
consideration by the jury.
The primary purpose of the discovery rules as permitted by statute
are to aid a party in preparing and pleading his case. The use of
depositions and interrogatories in evidence at the trial is only inci-
dental to this primary purpose, and are not considered ipso facto
evidence on any matter at the trial. 9 As a result of the liberal rules
5. The court stated: "The rule as to waiver of incompetency of the adverse
party has also been applied where the examination was by means of interroga-
tories." Nolty v. Fultz, 277 Ky. 49, 125 S.W.2d 749 (1939); Jones v. Jones, 245
Ala. 613, 18 So.2d 365 (1944); Woodyard, Adm'r. v. Sayre, 90 W. Va. 547, 111
S.E. 313 (1922); Smith, Adm'x. v. Clark, 219 Ark. 751, 244 S.W.2d 776
(1952).
6. Depositions: Arizona: Starkweather v. Conner, 44 Ariz. 369, 38 P.2d 311
(1934); Colorado: Gottesleben v. Luckenbach, 123 Colo. 429, 231 P.2d 958 (1951);
Florida: Herring v. Eiland ......... Fla ......... , 81 So.2d 645 (1955); Illinois: Pink v.
Dempsey, 350 Ill. App. 405, 113 N.E.2d 334 (1953); Michigan: Banoskiewicz v.
Baun, 359 Mich. 109, 101 N.W.2d 306 (1960); Nebraska: O'Neal v. First Trust
Company, 160 Neb. 469, 70 N.W.2d 466 (1955); Ohio: In re Renee, 159 Ohio St.
37, 110 N.E.2d 795 (1953); U.S.: Duling v. Markun, 231 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1956);
Stricker v. Morgan, 268 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1959); McCargo v. Steele, 160 F.Supp.
7 (D.C. Ark. 1958).
Interrogatories: Idaho: Thomas v. Thomas, 83 Ida. 86, 357 P.2d 935
(1960); Wyoming: Slover v. Harris, 77 Wyo. 295, 314 P.2d 953 (1957).
7. 53 Okl. 58, 156 P. 892 (1916).
8. Perlis v. Kuhns, Adm'r., supra. note 3 at 84, 195 A.2d 159.
9. Slover v. Harris, supra. note 6 at 298, 299, 314 P.2d 954; GooDRICH-
AMRAM, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, Depositions and Discovery, § 4007a
(16) (1962).
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of discovery, the attorneys come to trial thoroughly prepared and
familiar with both sides of the case. Surprise no longer is a big
element in the trial of a lawsuit. The most important function of the
liberal rules is that they tend to bring about a just decision on the
merits. A secondary consideration being that because the attorneys
are permitted to acquire a thorough familiarity with the case, the
rules tend to shorten the actual time spent at trial, and bring about
the speedy justice that is constantly a goal of the judiciary. 10 Henry,
in his book on Pennsylvania evidence, states the purpose of the rules
to be
... the discovery of facts relevant to a pending action neces-
sary for a party to prepare his pleadings or to prove a prima
facie claim or defense. .. .
An examination of the relevant rules pertaining to discovery is
necessary for a complete understanding of this field. Rule 4007 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
... the deponent may also be examined regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter in-
volved in the action and will substantially aid in the prepara-
tion of the pleadings or the preparation or trial of the case.
(Emphasis added.)
Written interrogatories are to be utilized for the same purpose and
are also limited in scope by this rule. 1 2 Rule 4020 which applies
equally to the use of written interrogatories or depositions at the trial
states that
... any part or all of the deposition, so far as admissible
under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party
who was present or represented at the taking of the deposi-
tion . . . (Emphasis added.)
Rule 4020 (c) holds further that
Subject to the provisions of Rule 4016 (b), objections may
be made at the trial or hearing to receiving in evidence any
deposition or part thereof for any reason which would re-
quire the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then
present and testifying. (Emphasis added.)
10. See generally HON. ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, A Judge Looks At The Rules,
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL CODE, West Publishing Company (1963),
at p. 9-12.
11. 1 HENRY, PA. EVIDENCE, § 221 (4th ed. 1953).
12. Pa. R.Civ. P. 4005(c), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 Appendix (1951).
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The provisions of Rule 4016 (b) referred to above are simply that
Objections to the competency of a witness or to the com-
petency, relevancy, or materiality of the testimony are not
waived by failure to make them before or during the taking
of the deposition, unless the ground of the objection is one
which was known to the objecting party and which might
have been obviated or removed if made at that time.
(Emphasis added.)
Since this rule is identical with Rule 32 (c) (1) 13 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, except for a substitution of the word "presented"
for "made", an interpretation of the Federal rule, from where it was
copied, should shed some light on the most likely interpretation of
the state rule. Barron and Holtzoff, noted authorities on federal prac-
tice state:
... that the examination should not be unduly lengthened
or obstructed by interposing objections of this type, since
they are not waived by failure to make them. 14
Finally Rule 4020(d) provides that
A party shall not be deemed to make a person his witness
for any purpose by taking his deposition. The introduction in
evidence of the deposition or any part thereof for any pur-
pose other than that of contradicting or impeaching the
deponent makes the deponent the witness of the party intro-
ducing the deposition. . . . (Emphasis added.)
From the preceding, it should be clear that the Rules do permit
the admission into evidence of a deposition or answers to interrog-
atories, nonetheless reserving to the opposing party any objections
which he might have at this time under Rules 4020 (a) and (c). Ob-
jections grounded in the fundamental rules of evidence may still be
raised at the trial stage. The fact that any or even all of the testi-
mony produced during discovery will not be admissible at the trial
stage should not prevent discovery since the question of the admissi-
13. Fed. R. Civ. P., 28 U.S.C.A. (1948); Objections to the competency of a
witness or to the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not
waived by failure to make them before or during the taking of the deposition,
unless the ground of the objection is one which might have been obviated or
removed if presented at that time.
14. 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 753 (1961).
It could be argued here that since the objection was known to the objecting party
at the time of the taking of the deposition, he waives it; however, the better
interpretation would seem to be that the waiver should pertain only to the taking
of the deposition and not to any objections which may be interposed at the trial.
[Vol. 2: p. 305
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bility of testimony at the discovery stage is irrelevant.' 5 Under Rule
4020 (d), one can readily see that the only time a deponent becomes
the witness of the party who takes his deposition is when the testi-
mony is introduced at the trial, by the one who took the deposition,
and not by the mere taking of the deposition itself. There obviously
are many things which the attorney should be and is permitted to
learn under our liberal discovery rules before the actual trial, which
could not and are not permitted to be revealed at trial. The attorney
can sift the testimony and determine its evidentiary value, while a
jury should be and is only permitted to hear that evidence which is
relevant and competent at the time of the trial.
The court in its decision quotes with approval a statement taken
from 2 HENRY ON PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE, 16 that
Calling an opponent to testify makes him competent for
himself in any subsequent trial of the same proceeding pro-
viding the issues and the parties are the same. The rule ap-
plies also where depositions of an opponent have been
taken... . 17
The problem with the court's utilization of such a cite is that the court
obviously failed to review the two cases from which Henry drew his
conclusion. Neither of these two cases will support the broad general
statement which Henry and the court now attribute to them. In Stiles
v. Bradford,' s the court held simply that a reading into evidence of a
deposition perhaps might be deemed an admission of the competency
of the witness by the party reading it, but they never referred to the
effect of a mere taking of a deposition. In Bennett v. Williams,' 9 the
court held only that depositions that are taken to be used as evidence
on the trial of the cause, would constitute a waiver of incompetency,
but never mentioned the modern discovery depositions, as they are
popularly known today.
The superior court also chose to cite the case of Rosche v. McCoy,2 0
which held that a surviving party was competent to testify once the
15. GOODRICH-AMRAM, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, Depositions and
Discovery, § 4007 (a) (25) (1962). "In the discovery stage, the question of admis-
sibility is irrelevant. What the inquirer wants is information; he wants discovery
in its true sense. He does not necessarily care whether the form in which he
receives it permits it to be admitted in evidence at a trial."
16. § 765; This statement was utilized in a previous lower court decision;
Sanoskie v. Beadling, 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 1 (1961).
17. Perlis v. Kuhns, Adm'r., supra. note 3 at 82, 195 A.2d 158.
18. Stiles v. Bradford, 4 Rawle 394, 401 (1834).
19. Bennett v. Williams, 57 Pa. 404, 405 (1868).
20. 397 Pa. 615, 156 A.2d 307 (1959).
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representative of the decedent offered in evidence the deposition of
the deceased. The supreme court by inference in that case pointed
out that even there the deposition of the decedent had to be offered
into evidence before the survivor became competent to testify. In
this case the deposition of the surviving plaintiff had also been taken;
yet the court held that if the representative did not offer into evidence
the deposition of his decedent, then the plaintiff could
... but that would not thereby make the oral testimony
of the minor plaintiff admissible. 2 1
Here then is one case where the competency of the minor plaintiff was
in issue at the time of the taking of the deposition, both as to his age
and the Dead Man's Act, once the defendant died. The former of these
objections was known to the defendant at the time of the taking of the
deposition; the latter was known only after the death of the defend-
ant; however, the court ruled that the trial judge still had to determine
the competency of the plaintiff at the time of the trial. The court
held further that even had he been ruled competent as to the former
objection at the time of trial, he was precluded from testifying unless
the defendant did one of two things: either introduce into evidence
the deposition of the deceased or offer the testimony of a living wit-
ness to the relevant matter.22 The superior court however chose to
stray outside the State of Pennsylvania and follow the minority view
adhered to in other states.
It is rather obvious that the court's dissatisfaction is with the
Dead Man's Act itself. As one lower court Pennsylvania case involving
the precise issue states:
We fail to see any reason why waiver should result except
for the reason plaintiff has so clearly urged, dissatisfaction
with the deadman's rule itself.2 3
However this court, which was not mentioned in the present case,
stated in denying that any waiver took place that
The bench and bar have expressed widespread dissatisfac-
tion with the rule, and the remedy is to eliminate the rule,
not to make bad law in order to avoid the application of the
rule.2 4 (Emphasis added.)
21. Id. at 626, 156 A.2d 312.
22. Id. at 618, 156 A.2d 313. Minor plaintiff was five years old when the
accident happened; he was seven years, nine months old when his deposition was
taken. The deposition of the minor plaintiff was taken during the lifetime of the
decedent, who died shortly before the trial.
23. Campbell v. Bennett, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 716, 718 (1961).
24. Ibid. See also Covert v. Cingolani, 1 Butler County Leg. J. 65 (Pa.
1956) where the court in considering the same question of waiver held that no
(Vol. 2: p. 305
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The superior court apparently chose rather to make "bad law", and
additionally, indulged in a bit of judicial legislating. It simply inter-
preted away the Dead Man's Act. If the Dead Man's Act is so unfair
(which this paper does not attempt to decide), then such a time-
honored rule and Statute should be changed by the legislature and
not by the courts.
What will be the eventual outcome of such a decision ?2 5 One might
argue nevertheless that the rule still prevails so long as no discovery
is utilized by the representative of the deceased. However what are
the practical results of such a course as is forced on the representa-
tive? His attorney must do nothing by way of any discovery; he must
simply sit back and wait. He must then go into court totally unpre-
pared to meet any testimony which his adversary presents on the
hope that the slim and only objection which he raises will be sus-
tained, and the case will be thrown out of court. He will not have the
benefit of knowing in advance if any witnesses other than the parties
exist since his deceased cannot tell him; he will not have the amount
of expenses which his opponent will be presenting; he will have the
benefit of none of the opponent's hospital records since he cannot
determine even which of the hospitals he has been confined to; and
he certainly cannot prepare any adequate defense on the merits
should his objection be overruled. The chances of ever settling such
a case before the actual trial are certainly reduced to an impossible
minimum.
Possibly the best way of illustrating the injustices brought about
by such a decision would be by two of many hypothetical examples
which could be conceived:
ILLUSTRATION 1. P., Administrator of a decedent's estate
brings an action for the wrongful death of
the deceased against the driver of the other
car involved in an accident. The collision
took place on a deserted road, with only
the two drivers present. P. relying on the
police report after the accident, the pre-
sumption of due care afforded a deceased,
and not wishing to waive the protection of
the Dead Man's Act, does nothing in the way
of discovery. The Statute of Limitations for
Death Actions passes. At the trial, a me-
waiver was intended by the rules, but rather that the rules were promulgated to
aid a person precisely in this situation.
25. Cf. Hughes v. Bailey, 202 Pa. Super. 263, 195 A.2d 281 (1963) where
the court cites the noted case on a point which is not relevant to this discussion.
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chanic testifies for D. that the brakes were
defectively repaired by G. garage the day
of the accident. The jury finds for D. on the
basis of this unexpected defense, which P.
had no knowledge of before the actual trial.
Since the Statute of Limitations has now run, no action can be brought
for the death of P.'s decedent against the negligent garage.
ILLUSTRATION 2. D., Administrator of the estate of the
deceased driver of an automobile which col-
lided with P., under the same set of facts as
in Illustration 1., is sued by P., except that P.,
who is living, is the only person who knows
of a witness who saw the entire incident and
places the blame on the deceased. This wit-
ness shows up at the trial to testify for P.
and hence D.'s objection is defeated; yet D.
had no advance notice of the witness and
therefore no time to prepare to meet this
testimony.
Essentially then the trial is limited to one issue: Will the objection be
sustained or not? If not, the element of surprise is surely put back
into the trial of a lawsuit; justice will many times be abused; and the
settlement of death actions will surely cease to occur.
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX - Marital Deduction - Effect of Revenue Pro-
cedure 64-19 on the use of the marital deduction under Pennsylvania
law - Methods of preservation of the marital deduction.
Revenue Procedure 64-19, 1964 INT. REV. BUL. 19.
At least as viewed by the Internal Revenue Service, estate planners
have heretofore apparently been capable of effecting a reduction in
the total Federal estate tax payable from the combined estates of a
decedent and his spouse by using language in the dispositive instru-
ment providing for a pecuniary formula marital deduction bequest,1
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2056 indicates in part:
"(a) Allowance of Marital Deduction - For purposes of the tax
imposed by section 2001, the value of the taxable estate shall, except
as limited by subsections (b), (c), and (d), be determined by deducting
from the value of the adjusted gross estate an amount equal in value
to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from
[Vol. 2: p. 305
